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Abstract
The paper studies the characteristics and the eects of a tax imposed by a local
government on the land used to create new tourists accommodations First a dy
namic policy game between a monopolist in a tourist area and a local government
is considered In each period the former has to decide the size of land undergo
ing development whereas the latter has to choose the tax to levy on each newly
developed area unit Linear Perfect Markov strategies are derived for both the
noncooperative and the public monopoly case In equilibrium a public monopoly
would develop land more rapidly than a private monopoly Furthermore the more
the monopolist discounts the future the more the long run use of the natural re
source is reduced Second the properties of the tax are studied considering an
oligopolistic market structure The tax alone does not lead to the socially optimal
level of land use However its combined eect with another policy instrument such
as a quota induces the optimal level of resource use
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  Introduction
Environmental quality is an extremely important input in the tourist industry But
tourism also makes extensive use of environmental resources thereby jeopardising its
main  raison detre and hence its long term viability Thus local government can
play a pivotal role in encouraging sustainable forms of tourism Sinclair and Stabler

Land which is used to build holiday accommodations represents the natural re
source under study More precisely in each period a developer has to decide the size of
territory to develop ie the increase in capacity A local government levies a tax per
unit of newly developed territory The tax is announced before the developer takes a
decision on how much land is to be built Following Benchekroun and van Long 
and Tahvonen  inter alia the interaction between the developer and the public
authority is analysed as a Stackelberg dierential game At a rst glance allowing a
strategic advantage to the local government ie making it the leader may not appear
plausible because in practice the government might be induced to yield to the requests
of the developer in order to lessen the pressure due for instance to regional labour
market problems However elsewhere I report the case study of the Master Plan
in Sardinia Italy where the local Sardinian government resisted the sirens song of
an inuential tourist developer in Costa Smeralda because the developers project was
deemed environmentally unsustainable Piga  In particular the Sardinian gov
ernment behaved like a Stackelberg leader when it declared its commitment to uphold
the existing territorial planning legislation and to refuse special permissions to the pri
vate developer to build within 	 metres from the coastline It is noteworthy that
Sardinia is characterised by one of the highest level of unemployment in Italy 
is the youth unemployment rate while the total rate is  and that the estimated
number of new jobs from the project was about  Nonetheless the Sardinian
government did not alter its position when the developer took the decision to withdraw
the project Furthermore from a practical viewpoint the fact that planning rules are
a given for any developer constitutes an example of local governments leadership
although it does not necessarily rule out the possibility that those rules are designed to
facilitate rather than restrain development Indeed to take this into account in this
paper the governments payo function is modelled in a exible way that accommo
dates for dierent preferences towards environmental conservation
The main objective of the paper is to show how a development tax can constitute a
useful policy instrument in tourist areas with sensitive environmental features To this

end four cases are considered whereby the characteristics and the eects of the tax are
studied under dierent models specications and market structures In the rst the
Pareto optimal cooperative case is derived as a benchmark for the subsequent analysis
In the second the agents behave noncooperatively A comparison between the rst
two cases shows that the tax is Pigouvian However more insights are obtained by
looking at the dierences in the two cases Firstly if the monopolist discounts time
more than the local authority an inverse relationship between land development and
the discount rate is established ie more land is used in the cooperative relative to the
noncooperative case Rowthorn and Brown  derive a similar relationship within
an endogenous growth model Secondly it is shown that land exploitation occurs more
slowly under the noncooperative framework Similar qualitative results are also found
in Wirl  and Tahvonen  who consider the eects of a tax levied on energy
consumption in respectively a Cournot and a Stackelberg dynamic game between
energy producers and a government
The third case demonstrates that the previous results are robust to a dierent spec
ication of the local governments payo function Furthermore it identies situations
where the optimal tax is always increasing decreasing or constant over time
The fourth case shows that under a duopolistic market structure to prevent a
Tragedy of the Commons situation from arising the optimal tax has to be discontin
uously increased to eliminate the rms incentive to continue development This policy
can be generalised to the case of a market structure consisting of more than two rms
Barnett  shows that the optimal tax on euents generated by a monopolist
may be less than the marginal euent harm Indeed a higher tax would induce the
monopolist to further reduce the level of production and consequently the consumers
surplus Ebert and von dem Hagen  develop a model where consumption and
production costs depend on the level of emissions They obtain a result similar to
Barnetts for the optimal tax when pollution and the monopolists product are comple
ments and the opposite result when they are substitutes In this paper the optimal tax
levied by the local government is always above the marginal damage except in steady
state where they are equal This is due to the redistributive role of the tax which is
used by the government to appropriate some of the prots of the foreign developer
To my knowledge there is no formal model explicitly linking tourism its use of
natural resources and policy intervention But there exists an empirical literature link
ing tourist demand and environmental quality Bell and Leeworthy  nd using a
sample of Floridas tourists that a higher perceived level of crowdedness increases the
number of days spent at saltwater beaches and hence the extramarket value of the

beaches services and resources Such a nding can be explained by taking into account
the social dimension associated with the consumption of many leisure activities where
the demand of one consumer can depend on the demands by other consumers Becker

 
Using data from the Balearics Islands Font  nds that the areas least
altered by man with the lowest levels of environmental alterations and more vegetation
are most frequented by tourists This is in line with the assumption in this paper that
the price of a holiday is positively related to the quality of a destinations environment
That is tourists are willing to pay a higher price to stay in a noncrowded resort
The following section lays out the model The socially optimum equilibrium is
characterised in Section 	 whereas the dynamic Stackelberg game is solved in Section
 Section 
 adopts a dierent specication for the local governments payo function
The oligopoly case is developed in Section  Section  concludes The Appendix
contains the proofs of the main propositions
 Model Specication
  The monopolists prot function
We consider a territory of size

L privately owned by a monopoly In each period
the monopolist has to decide the rate of land exploitation that is the portion of the
territory on which new tourist facilities hotels will be erected Denote the rate of
exploitation as t Thus the stock of built territory Bt evolves over time as
follows

Bt  t t  R

 B   Bt 

L 
The previous expression indicates that the development is irreversible its initial
size is nil and it is not subject to depreciation

Through appropriate normalisation
capacity ie the number of rooms in the establishment can be expressed as equal
to the size of developed territory Kt  Bt Development costs are equal to
C
d
t 
 



t

The model depicted so far highlights the wellknown impact of
 
Bell and Leeworthy  do not report the estimates of two other measures of environmental
quality used in their study ie the perceived cleanliness of waters and the physical appearance of the
site which if negative would indicate that social factors and not environmental considerations such
as those assumed in this paper drive tourist demand in their sample

Ageing of the buildings entails costs for maintenance redecoration and refurnishing These are
without loss of generality normalised to zero

The extreme assumption of diminishing return in development can be mitigated by considering a
more general cost function in which the development costs depend also on the stock of built territory	
C
d


 

    B In the case of the minus sign a learning by doing eect is present On the other
hand the plus sign cannot be ruled out because as the project progresses a ricardian diminishing
	
tourist development on environmental quality maintaining the resource base intact is
impossible if some level of tourist activity takes place
As discussed in the Introduction the importance of the environmental quality in
the tourist industry is reected in the tradeo for the monopolist between the size
of the development and the price of a holiday

The following inverse demand func
tion emphasises that tourists are willing to pay more if the resort is not too intensely
exploited
pt  a

L Bt   a 

L 
Indeed this expression shows that the price charged in each period depends posi
tively on

L  Bt that is the amount of land which is not built upon However it
can be argued that visitors have some interior degree of developedness which they
prefer and which tradeso the desire for facilities other visitors and local inhabitants
to interact with etc with the desire to not to be entirely surrounded by concrete
This would imply a demand function that at least at low levels of capacity is upward
sloping as Becker  demonstrates Thus the present analysis is therefore appli
cable to resorts where the visitors psychological carrying capacity has been reached
and an extra visitor provides a negative externality to the existing tourists However
even if the territory was entirely developed B 

L consumers would still attribute a
positive value to their visits given by a which depends on the other site features that
are exogenous to our model
   The governments objective function
The local government may levy a tax denoted as t on each unit of newly built
territory Thus the rst element of the governments instantaneous payo function is
represented by the tax receipts tt which are redistributed within the generation
that collects them
Because in many tourist destinations the great majority of tourists and tourism en
terprises come from abroad I assume that the consumer surplus enjoyed by the tourists
and the prots made by the developer do not enter specically into the governments
utility function
return eect can compel the monopolist to choose less advantageous sites for its buildings In both
cases no meaningful insights are gained which is why the simpler cost specication is chosen

It has to be stressed that the product sold is a perishable good such as a holiday and not a durable
good such as a house because as Coase  rst pointed out a monopoly selling a durable good
will behave dierently from the familiar monopoly selling a ow good See Tirole  for a further
discussion of the Coase conjecture

However the second part of the governments payo function consists of the net
value derivable from the use of the land On the one hand its development generates a
multipliergrowth eect on the local economy that can also include the surplus enjoyed
by the locals buying a holiday from the developer On the other development engenders
environmental costs and loss for the local population in nonuse benets such as bequest
option and existence values Pearce et al 
The net local value function NLV F  represents the net eect of these two op
posing forces
NLV F Bt   

L Bt 	
Such specication deserves further explaination For    the NLV F depends
positively on the size of the undeveloped territory That is the environmental costs from
development exceed the multipliergrowth benets In the other case when    the
NLV F is increasing in the size of the development and the multiplier eect dominates
In this case the NLV F corresponds to the loss in income due to foregone development
To sum up a positive  represents the marginal value of a unit of undeveloped territory
whereas a negative  corresponds to the net income loss from leaving a unit of territory
undeveloped
Finally the interpretation of  can be further extended so as to incorporate into
the model other aspects which are taken into account in the literature on sustainable
development When positive I argue that the denition of  by the public authorities
should reect concerns on the preservation of the natural system complexity and its
resilience in the sense that a higher value of  should be associated with a frailer
natural system Barbier and Markandya 
 The publicly owned monopoly
The Pareto socially optimal solution provides a benchmark for our analysis In this
framework the monopolist and the local authority are combined into a single entity
that is a social planner who has to solve the following problem
max

c
t
Z


e
 t

B
c

a

LB
c






c
  

L B
c


dt st

B
c
 
c
 
where 	 denotes the time invariant governments discount rate the maintenance
and production costs are normalised to zero subscript c the cooperative outcome and


the time arguments are suppressed
Proposition  The optimal exploitation rule in the cooperative problem  is

 
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 
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The state variable B
c
t evolves along the following time path with steady state in B
ss
c

B
c
t  B
ss
c





a 

L 

e

 

p





t

 
B
ss
c


a 

L  


 
As 
 shows the land exploitation rule is declining in time Indeed the biggest
portion of territory is developed at the beginning of the planning horizon when B
c
 
 The rationale behind such a choice is clear it is optimal to build the capacity as soon
as possible because an extra unit of capacity today generates revenues forever Such
a result emphasises the importance of the chosen dynamic approach as no insights of
this kind can be obtained in a static model
Higher values of  aect negatively both the rate of exploitation and the steady
state level of the stock of built territory Of course this result is inverted when the 
is negative that is when the growth benets overcome the environmental costs
	
 The noncooperative case
The framework used in this section to analyse the interaction between the monopolist
and the local government is that of a dierential game To solve the game a Stackelberg
equilibrium in linear MarkovPerfect strategies is derived Benchekroun and van Long
 Ba sar and Olsder 
 Dockner et al  M!aler and de Zeeuw  Ba sar
and Olsder 
 	

 and Dockner et al	   distinguish between a
feedback and a global Stackelberg solution


The former implies that in each period
the leadergovernment rst announces a given level of tax and then the monopolist
decides the size of the territory on which new capacity will be built In this case the
government only faces a stagewise advantage over the developer The latter assumes
that the follower knows the rule that the leader will use throughout the game That is
the government announces at the outset of the game that the tax rule is given by the
strategy 
 
 B Then the follower taking this rule as given seeks to maximize her

When  
  only the prots from the establishment are taken into account in 	 this is the case
where a private monopolist operates without any State intervention

This point was raised by an anonymous referee

objective function However for the models considered in this paper it can be shown
that when the global tax rule is a linear a"ne function of B namely B    B
the feedback and the global Stackelberg equilibria coincide Proof available from the
author on request
Restricting the analysis to the Stackelberg case is a natural choice as in practice
it is the government that sets the rules by which developers have to abide A counter
argument could be that rules may be set so as to please rather than restrain the
developer This would be tantamount to allowing the multiplier eects to be greater
than the environmental costs a case we tackle by considering the consequences of a
negative  and by the further analysis in Section 

The monopolist and the policymaker maximise the discounted innite ow of in
stantaneous payos respectively given by subscript nc denotes the non cooperative
solution
max

nc
V
 
B 
Z
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e
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t
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B
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a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
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nc

The discount rate of the government and the private monopolist denoted respec
tively as 	
g
and 	
 
 dier so as to consider the possibility that these two agents might
give dierent weights to future payos As Rowthorn and Brown  p	 explain
one way to encourage conservation would be to use a low discount rate for species while
maintaining a high discount rate for consumption goods	    when conservationists call
for a low discount rate for environmental pro
t they are tacitly assuming that the dis
count rate for the consumption goods will remain high Hence we assume 	
 
 	
g

that is public authorities discount the future less than a private agent
The Bellman equation for the monopolists autonomous innite horizon problem is
max

	

V

B  B

a 

L B

  






V


B

 
where V
 
B denotes the monopolists value function for the game which starts at
B It can be interpreted as the maximum price that the monopolist would be willing to
pay to buy the land or as the maximum lumpsum tax that the local government can
impose on the monopolist The time arguments and the subscript nc are neglected as

no confusion can arise Applying foc yields

 
 V


B  
In each period the marginal cost of an extra unit of developed territory must be
equal to the marginal intertemporal benet it provides That is the marginal benet
for the monopolist of the last unit of developed territory must equal the marginal cost
represented by the development tax
The governments Bellman equation is dened as
max

	
g
V
g
B    


L B



V

g
B

 
where V
g
B denotes the government value function for the game starting at B
After substituting  into  the foc in the government problem yields

 




V


B V

g
B
	
	
Therefore the government behaves like a Stackelberg leader as it incorporates the
monopolists optimal choice before deciding its optimal strategy Thus the optimal tax
depends on the dierence between the shadow prices of land for the developer and
the government Moreover in steady state 
ss
  Hence from  we have
V


B
ss
  V

g
B
ss
  
ss
 
Proposition  For the policy game identi
ed by  and  there exists a unique
global feedback Stackelberg equilibrium in linear and stable Markov Perfect strategies
for the exploitation rate 
 
nc
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 and the tax level 
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Proof  See Appendix
The exploitation rule in 
 follows a pattern similar to that identied in Propo
sition  That is it is declining in time and depends linearly and negatively on the
stock of developed land The governments optimal response is to impose a tax with a
downward time trend thereby providing the monopolist with an incentive to postpone
development

In time the magnitudes of both choice variables decrease as the stock of built
territory grows until they reach their steady state values
Proposition  The steady state values for the tax level the price and the built territory
are

ss
nc


	
g

p
ss
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
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Proof  See Appendix
Dierent policy conclusions can be drawn depending on the sign of  First relative
to the case of a positive  the instantaneous tax in  is always lower when   
Second when    at time t   the tax is positive However as the rate of land
development declines it is optimal for the local government to reduce the tax until it
becomes negative ie a subsidy see  Such a switch in policy would not occur
when   
An inspection of  and  reveals that when 	  	
 
 	
g
 the steady state value
for the stock of developed land is the same in both of the cases considered Therefore
since the imposition of a tax leads to the Pareto optimal use of the territory the tax
considered here is Pigouvian Once again the interpretation of the Pigouvian nature
of the tax hinges on the sign of  Consider    As  shows in steady state
the tax is equal to the governments present discounted value of the marginal cost of
developing a unit of land As the tax is declining over time a fortiori the tax is always
above the marginal damage By the same token when    the subsidy is always
below the governments marginal benet and as we have seen can be even negative
ie a tax
These ndings depend crucially on the particular role played here by the tax which
diers from that in Barnett  and Ebert and von dem Hagen  where the
social planner maximises the sum of producers and consumers surplus As we have
outlined in section  many tourist destinations around the world attract foreign vis
itors who buy their holidays from international enterprises Thus the local government
need not be concerned of the surplus that tourists enjoy or the prot that the rm
makes Under these circumstances the tax on land can serve the purpose of redis
tributing some of the monopolists prot in favour of the local government This is
only possible if the tax is above the marginal damage or the subsidy is not introduced

from the outset but only at a later stage of development
Interestingly when    and 	
 
 	
g
  shows that the use of the territory
under two independent agents acting noncooperatively is unambiguously less than that
obtained under a single social planner

Thus in situations where the private developer
discounts the future more than the government the use of the natural resource is lower
than in the case when the two agents have the same discount rate Moreover land use
in the noncooperative case is greater than the social optimum when the government
discounts the future more heavily than the developer
Proposition 	 The built territory describes the following time trajectories
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If 	  	
 
 	
g
 then a comparison of  with  reveals that in the cooperative set
ting the rate of territory exploitation occurs at a faster speed than in the noncooperative
framework	
Proof  See Appendix
It is noteworthy that when 	
 
 	
g
 the development tax slows the rate of land
exploitation relative to the case of a public monopoly Together  and  highlight
the benecial eects of tax on the natural resource and hence emphasise the active role
that the local authorities can play in order to implement environmentally conscious
policies Furthermore the tax generates results consistent with the rules traditionally
imposed by territory planners For instance construction is not usually allowed in a
park When  is big as in a natural park the level of the announced tax should be so
high that the monopolist would not nd it protable to develop the site
 An alternative specication
Thus far the NLV F was either positive or negative over the entire planning horizon
This implies that the environmental values of the resource always overcome the increase
in local income generated by the tourism development or vice versa In this section I
consider a formulation of the NLV F such that at an early stage of development the
growth eect dominates the environmental one but as the development progresses
the environmental cost of development outweighs its benets
NLV F t  Bt  B

t 


The opposite conclusion can be drawn when   

where    measures the signicance of the environmental opportunity costs pre
viously discussed
The analysis is carried out as in Section  Most of the previous results still hold
under this specication In particular the tax is still Pigouvian and relative to the
cooperative framework the tax determines a slower rate of land use
Proposition 
 If  is substituted in  the policy game given by  has a
unique global feedback Stackelberg equilibrium in linear Markov Perfect strategies for
the rate of land use $t and the tax level
$
t
$t 
 	
g
 	


	

	
g
%

Bt 
	
g
a

L  	

	

	
g
%
 	
$
t 

%  	


 	
g

 %
	

Bt  	
g

a 

L  %a    

L 	


	
g
 	

 	

	
g
%

where % 
p
 	

	
g
  	


  	

	
g
 	
g

 	
g

	


	 The steady state values are
$
B
ss



	
g
a

L  	

	
g
  	



$

ss

 a 

L  
	
g
  	


Proof  The proof is available from the author on request
The rate of land exploitation in 	 keeps its declining prole but from 
the tax may now increase remain constant or decrease over time for respectively
%	


	
g

%

  with the negative sign occurring for low enough values
of  and high enough values of 	
 
and 	
g

Two points are noteworthy First  and  indicate that for low enough
values of  there exists a point in time
$
t   where the local government switches its
regulatory regime and turns the tax into a subsidy
Secondly a signicant environmental externality dictates an upward trend in the
tax At low levels of development postponing the investment is not the optimal re
sponse as the benets from growth outweigh the costs An increasing tax prevents
further development when the environmental cost becomes conspicuous A similar
result is obtained in Ulph and Ulph  where the time prole of a carbon tax
is increasing over time whenever the GNP loss from having to cut CO

emissions is
greater than the damage done

 The oligopoly case
The analysis in this section considers how the tax has to be modied when two or more
generally n developers operate on the same territory The analysis shows that in these
circumstances excess exploitation occurs unless the optimal tax is discontinuous over
time That is a jump in the level of the land tax is required to establish the socially
optimum outcome
Consider for simplicity two rms operating on a territory of size equal to

L If we
assume homogenous quality in the two adjacent sites the price equation  becomes
pt  a

L B
 
t B

t with

B
 
 
 
and

B

 

 
That is now
i
and

B
i
 i    identify respectively the rms development rates
and capacities located on a territory under the administration of a local government
whose objective function is represented as in 
Proposition  Assuming equality of the discount rates 	
 
 	

 	
g
 	 the steady
state values of the size of territory developed by each 
rm is
B
ss
 
 B
ss
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a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That is the total use of land in the unrestricted duopoly case exceeds the social
optimum see the Appendix for a proof	
This indicates that even in the simplest context considered in the paper the tax alone
fails to limit the use of land to the optimal level when two or more rms operate This
is due to the fact that in oligopolistic markets a rm does not internalise the nega
tive eects on the other rms revenues that result from an increase in its capacity
Hence rms develop more territory and their revenues are reduced The tax therefore
capture less rents for the government which then has an incentive to allow more de
velopment This implies that land use increases with the number of rms operating
in the market However in order to reconcile the analysis in the preceding sections
with the case of an oligopolistic market structure we show that the development tax
can reestablish the Pareto outcome when the following constraint is imposed to the
government maximization problem
B
 
 B

 B
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a

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
That is the total amount of territory rms are allowed to develop cannot exceed
the socially optimal level given in  Such a constraint is equivalent to the imposition
of a quota on the total number of tourists that can visit the territory To deal with

this statespace constraint we adopt the modied version of the Maximum Principle
described in Chiang  pp 		
Proposition  Under the exploitation time path implied by  there exists a point
in time  when the constraint  becomes binding with B
 
  B

 
B
ss
c

	 At  
 
a

L
 
	 The optimal policy is to increase  by an amount equal to the value
of the Lagrange multiplier  attached to the space constraint   
a

L
 
See
the Appendix for a proof	
The discontinuous increase is made necessary to prevent further development In
deed at time  the market price is from  p  a 

L 
 for the tourism
industry as a whole the total discounted value of an extra unit of developed land would
therefore be
p

 which equals the sum   
With a greater number of rms the jump in the tax would still be necessary to
realign the private and the public interests The timing of the policy change would be
brought forward by an increase in the number of rms as more rms would exploit
the natural resources more quickly However the magnitude of the tax increase is
not aected by the number of rms as it depends solely on the shadow price of land
evaluated when B  B
ss
c

In practical terms when imposing the constraint the government is eectively ap
plying a quota restriction on the number of visitors The quota is set at a level that
represents the territorys carrying capacity or equivalently the socially optimal level of
the land use Although carrying capacity can be di"cult to quantify it constitutes an
essential element for tourism planning in realworld situations For instance McIntyre
	 reports that in Goa India the application of the standard of one meter of beach
frontage per tourist bed results in an overall regional maximum development of 
tourist beds with no more than 	
 km of beach frontage expected to be utilized for
development
To conclude the analysis in the present section shows that when an oligopolistic
market is considered the socially optimal outcome can be achieved if the development
tax is complemented by another policy instrument namely a quota on the number of
tourists As shown in the previous sections the tax continues to play an essential role
in so far as it enables the government to appropriate some of the surplus generated by
the tourism development and it slows down the rate of land use thereby postponing
the negative eects associated with development
	
	 Conclusion
The impacts of tourist activity on the natural environment are manifold their long
term eects are therefore di"cult to predict The interest in the use of dierent policy
instruments information and education taxation and subsidies permissions and quota
legal instruments under various circumstances is growing Hunter and Green 

A recent study by Cremer and Thisse  shows that taxation proves to be a robust
environmental policy instrument in imperfectly competitive markets where consumers
like in the present case are willing to pay more to buy an environmentally friendly
product
In this paper the properties of a development tax on land are studied by consid
ering dierent specications of the governments payo function and dierent market
structures Focussing on such an instrument constitutes a natural choice as it is tradi
tionally used in a great number of countries The optimal tax exhibits some noteworthy
features First it is Pigouvian Second it may become negative ie a subsidy when
the damage level from environmental degradation is low and tourism spurs growth
However the government should never oer the subsidy at the starting point of the
development especially if it cannot make sure that the great bulk of prots generated
by tourism is kept within the regionalnational borders
Furthermore the tax induces a slowing down in the speed with which a private
monopolist develops land relative to the case where the developer is a public enter
prise Such a result implies that concerted forms of tourism development between a
private agent and the public authority may not be necessary and could result in a faster
exploitation of the natural resource More precisely the results show that the best out
come from an environmental point of view is obtained when the local government uses
its strategic role as a Stackelberg leader and commits to an optimal subgame perfect
taxation policy The optimal level of the tax in each period depends among other
things on the weight given to the concerns regarding the preservation of the natural
system complexity and its resilience
Finally the application of the development tax needs to be accompanied by another
policy instrument namely a quota on the number of tourists to obtain the Pareto
outcome under an oligopolistic market structure Such a result is consistent with the
observation that both the tax and the landuse planning systems are jointly used to
regulate the tourist industry in practice Sinclair and Stabler  pp&

Appendix
Proof of Propositions   and 	 By assigning  and  to the Bellman equations 
and  we obtain a system of dierential equations with unknowns V
i
B i 
  	
 


 B

a 

L B



V

 
B  V

g
B


  

V

B 
 

V

 
B  V

g
B


 

L B 
g
V
g
B 
 

Given the linearquadratic structure of the game we know that the value functions V
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These two expressions hold true if their terms multiplying B

 B and their constant terms are
simultaneously equal to zero To achieve this we need to solve a system of six equations in the six
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where the values of 

and 

were omitted because of their irrelevance to the proof Recalling 
  and the value functions  the dierential equation expressing the law of motion for
the state variable Bt becomes	
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Substituting the rst solution set  and solving the dierential equation yields	
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The above expression depicts an explosive path for the state variable since  
 
g


 and is
therefore ruled out When the second solution set  is substituted into  we obtain	
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which globally and asymptotically converges towards the steady state value 
Having shown that the game has a stable solution it is straightforward to derive  and  by


assigning   and  to  and 
Proof of Propositions  and  We will look for the openloop Nash equilibrium of the
following problems for respectively the duopolists and the local government	
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First of all the statespace constraint is transformed by taking the derivative wrt time	
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Given its leader role it suces to impose the constraint only on the governments problem so that
the usual conditions apply to the Hamiltonian of the duopolists dependance on time is omitted	
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where 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are the costate variable of the two usual constraints Note that the same result
would be obtained if the statespace constraint were applied to the duopolists problems Applying the
Maximum principle yields	
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After substituting for 
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from  the Hamiltonian for the government is	
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where  is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the modied statespace constraint The conditions
are	
dH
g
d

  
   
ii
 
jj
 
gi
 
gj
   i j 
   i 
 j 
dH
g
d 

 
d
i
 
d
j
     
dH
g
d 

  
B
d
i
 B
d
j

a

L 

 
	
a

L 

 B
d
i
 B
d
j


  


gi

 
gi

dH
d
dB
i

  
gi
  i 
   
Notice that  can be obtained by simply disregarding the statespace constraint that is for 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This also holds when the constraint is not binding from  When the constraint is activated 
becomes positive Hence 
i

 
j

  which implies from   
 
ii

 
jj
 The expression

in square brackets in  is also equal to zero Substitute these ndings in  and recall that in
equilibrium
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system of ordinary equations made up by   the expression in square brackets in  and 
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